In this paper we aim at theoretically grounding the Reducing Emissions from De- ically different information rent / efficiency trade-off. If the contract is performancebased (resp. conditionality-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) deforestation. In a simple quadratic setting, there is a reference level threshold in terms of efficiency towards less deforestation. In terms of expected welfare, conditional avoided deforestation-based schemes are preferred.
Introduction
Climate change is a worldwide issue that needs to be tackled regarding human-induced activities and pressure on natural resources. One of the primary sources of carbon emissions is deforestation and forest degradation, which are responsible for anthropogenic GHG emissions of about 12% (Van der Werf et al. (2009)) to 15-20% (IPCC (2007a 15-20% (IPCC ( , 2007b ). These emissions are the second highest human-induced source of climate change (Lederer (2011) ). More specifically, tropical forest deforestation through land-use change was responsible for about 25% of all carbon emissions in the 1990s (Heal and Conrad (2006) ). 1 There is an urgent need to cope with deforestation as induced climate change costs are estimated to increase to USD 1 Trillion by the 2100 time horizon (Eliasch (2008) , cited by Lederer (2011) ). Curbing deforestation is not an infeasible task (Kindermann et al. (2008) ). Eliasch (2008) states that 3.5 Gt CO2 could be saved per year. As a consequence, there is a need to design suitable international institutional arrangements.
To deal with the deforestation and forest degradation issue, the international community has been promoting the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation + (REDD+) scheme to shape the post-Kyoto architecture. Regarding the relationships between developed and developing countries, the idea of the REDD+ scheme is rather simple and intuitive: developed countries (or Northern countries) pay developing countries (or Southern countries) to implement reductions in carbon emissions from forests, whilst covering their opportunity costs to do so in altering their development paths. This payment occurs either by a direct monetary transfer (through a bilateral relationship or a global fund), or through carbon offsets or credits saleable on the carbon market.
The payment-basis lies in per unit reductions of deforestation in comparison to a baseline that needs to be agreed upon (this means the Business-As-Usual (BAU) deforestation level if the REDD+ scheme were not effective or rather the Reference Level (RL), or crediting baseline, which allows compensation to the developing country if emissions are below that level within the REDD+ scheme 3 ). Developed countries benefit from climate change mitigation in avoiding taking any action to cope with carbon emissions directly. They delegate the climate change mitigation task to developing countries by rewarding them.
There is an ongoing debate with regards to the REDD+ scheme in terms of rewards given to developing countries. According to Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) , the originality of REDD lies in its incentive properties since intrinsically it rewards States for their achievements in actions against deforestation. They stress that REDD payments are therefore basically performance-based (through the third phase described above) and this leaves the choice of policy instruments to the recipient countries. As a consequence, REDD payments are not related to the adoption of policy measures or changes in the legal or institutional framework (through the implementation phase described above). In other words, there is no conditionality and REDD is "not encroaching on the sovereign discretion of nations to design acceptable and adequate policies and measures nationally" (Streck (2010) cited by Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) ).
In the literature, several studies have been interested in climate change mitigation and low cost policies compared to costly abatement of fossil fuel emissions, in particular regarding One of our aims is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of this proposal. According to Figuières and Midler (2011) , the REDD proposal looks like a cost-effectiveness tool, and the underlying question is how to impose an exogenous limit or any limit on deforestation at the lowest cost for financing countries. Deforestation is a negative externality that can be internalized through a modified version of "compensation mechanisms" (Varian (1994) ), and they design fair rules towards REDD. For our part, we distinguish our approach whilst using the theory of incentives whereas this limitation is embodied in the contract.
The REDD scheme implementation has been considered by Leplay et al. (2011) through:
on the one hand, a bilateral relationship between a developed country and a developing country; and on the other hand, Payments for Environmental Services (PES) from a developing country to local communities. But they do not consider any incomplete information issue in both stages. Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) describe literally how the theory of incentives is at the core of the REDD+ scheme, and they request conditionalities for carbon payments.
Moreover, some authors and NGOs argue that the methodology currently used to assess it relies only on the marginal opportunity cost of forest preservation and neglects transaction, implementation and governance costs. Actually, a couple of bilateral contracts have already been signed that appear to suffer from this kind of discrepancy between high ex ante reference levels of deforestation and surprisingly low actual deforestation rates leading to significant avoided deforestation and accordingly to large money transfers between the donor country and the developing country (e.g., Norway versus Guyana or Indonesia).
The first objective of our article is to theoretically ground the REDD+ scheme as a contractual relationship between countries in the light of the theory of incentives (Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont and Martimort (2002) ). To our best knowledge, there is no analytical paper of the REDD+ scheme in terms of the theory of incentives with a Principal-Agent relationship with incomplete information and exogenous implementation and transaction costs. 4 We aim at revealing what is at stake in designing these contracts.
The second objective is to show that two types of contracts are feasible: on the one hand, a performance-based contract corresponding to the current way to consider avoided deforestation; on the other hand, a conditionality-based avoided deforestation contract corresponding to proposals arising in the literature and policy papers. 5 The conditional approach can be designed through observable actions or effective efforts towards avoided deforestation. Both contracts are incentive feasible and ground the REDD+ scheme in a different manner: the performance-based contract corresponds to the compensation phase of the REDD+ funding, whereas the conditional avoided deforestation-based contract grounds the implementation phase of the REDD+ funding. Asymmetric information indeed prevents policymakers from using first-best economic instruments through information rents with trade-offs between efficiency and information rents. 4 Chiroleu-Assouline and Roussel (2010) already used these theoretical tools to design incentive mechanisms promoting soil carbon sequestration. 5 These two contractual relationships are connected to input or output incentive schemes formerly analyzed by Crampes (1983) and Maslin and Riley (1985) . These papers point out the superiority of output based schemes in asymmetric informational contexts. 
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The third objective is to discuss what are the menu of contracts a developed country should offer in terms of environmental efficiency regarding a developing country's hidden information and expected welfare. The underlying question within our methodological approach is the following one: how does incomplete information increase the costs of the REDD+ scheme through information rents for each kind of contract?
In our analytical framework, we obtain several important results. Firstly, we can state that, because we take account of implementation and transaction costs, each kind of REDD+ contract implies a different information rent / efficiency trade-off. If the contract is performancebased, information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest deforestation in order to encourage them to induce the highest efficiency whilst coping with deforestation. A puzzling consequence emerges: the resulting avoided deforestation through effective domestic efforts can be decreasing with the baseline announced. If the contract is conditionality-based, then this does play in the opposite way as information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante highest deforestation, and therefore the optimal scheme implies tackling forest areas where deforestation is per se the highest. Secondly, whilst comparing these contracts, there is a baseline threshold in terms of environmental effectiveness concerning less deforestation.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we develop a barebones example to outline as simply as possible the economics of our analytical arguments and results. In Section 3, we present our theoretical Principal-Agent model. In Section 4, we design and analyse the performance-based contract that we call the deforestation performance (DP) scheme, whereas in Section 5, we design and analyse the conditionality-based effective domestic efforts contract that we call conditional avoided deforestation (CAD) scheme. A full discussion is provided in Section 6 in terms of contract comparisons regarding their efficiency towards lower deforestation, baseline assessment and political economy insights. Section 7 concludes. In this section, we compute a simple bare-bones numerical example illustrating the intuitions behind and the economics of the REDD+ contracting schemes that we will consider. For the sake of simplicity, we reason in terms of the deforestation rate, the baseline rate and the Reference Level (RL) within a developing country, as well as in USD millions regarding respectively the benefits of deforestation, the costs of avoiding deforestation, and monetary compensation from Northern countries to Southern countries.
The Baseline, Reference Level and monetary compensation
Consider a developing country (say Indonesia or Guyana) which knows exactly what deforestation rate it would expect to achieve per year as a baseline, e.g., 0.25% per year. We suppose that this country specifies its baseline through reports of private experts it has hired as consultants. Consider a developed country as a donor (say Norway) that does not know exactly what the rational base for computing this baseline is. This donor country thinks that this baseline is 0.25% with a probability of 1/2 but 0.36% with a probability of 1/2.
Obviously reducing deforestation implies a costly effort (greater than the sole opportunity cost of loosing the utility derived from deforestation, because of transaction and implementation costs) for the developing country which must be compensated. Hence the donor country will propose a menu of contracts and expect that announcing a high baseline will yield to initiatives by the developing country that will strongly moderate its deforestation. In turns, the donor country will anticipate that larger costs will have to be reimbursed and so the monetary transfer will increase with the RL that is set. Assume for simplicity that the developing country's net benefit is exactly the effective deforestation level achieved minus the cost to avoid deforestation which differs with regards to the baseline rate. For example, if the effective deforestation rate was 0.09% for a developing country whose RL is 0.25%, then the domestic effort to reduce deforestation is −0.16% and costs USD 80M. its gross benefits will be of USD160M though its real applied effort to avoid deforestation will not be of −0.2% but of −0.09% (0.16% − 0.25%) with 0.25% being its genuine RL which costs only USD45M (unlike the previous cost at USD80M). Hence the so-called rent (benefit) will be of USD95M since the net benefit of "cheating" or "mimicking a higher RL" is 160−45+180 =USD295M whereas its RL real benefit outside any contractual commitment should be USD200M. Hence the developing country whose real RL is 0.25% has an incentive to overstate its RL rate: 8 this has a detrimental effect on the efficiency of the menu of contracts previously proposed. We sum up this situation in Table 2 .
Observable domestic reduction efforts
Secondly, if we consider that domestic efforts to avoid deforestation are observable and contractable for the donor country, then the developed country decides to offer a menu of contracts based on public policy levers as < T, AD >. Then a developing country whose RL is 0.36% will choose the contract set for a developing country whose RL is 0.25%. This means that a developing country will choose a contract in which the avoided deforestation rate is lower than what is expected under its suitable commitment and then will earn some rents from its private information. Indeed, having a lower domestic effort to avoid deforestation at−0.16% (in lieu of −0.20%), the cost of avoiding deforestation will be set at USD80M but its real benefit will be of USD179M in deforesting at a higher rate at 0. Table 3 : Asymmetric information on the Avoided Deforestation level 0.16%) (unlike the previous benefit of USD120M). Hence, the so-called rent (benefit) will be of USD19M since the net benefit of "cheating" this way or "mimicking a lower RL" is 179 − 80 + 160 =USD259M whereas the RL real benefit outside any contractual commitment should be USD240M. Hence the developing country whose actual RL is 0.36% RL now has an incentive 9 to understate its RL rate. This leads also to a detrimental effect on the contract efficiency.
Facing these uncertainties, how can a donor country manage to design an REDD+ scheme with a recipient country? This is exactly the aim of our analysis, in which any developed country can offer a menu of incentive contracts that leads the developing country to choose the suitable contract and therefore to reveal its private information (i.e., regarding its RL, either its real deforestation rate, or its avoided deforestation rate). We sum up this situation in Table 3 Incentive contract in the case of unobservable domestic reduction efforts: performancebased rewards
We claim that when developing countries domestic efforts to avoid deforestation are unobservable, the donor country could propose such a deforestation performance incentive contract based on required ex post deforestation rates displayed in Table 4 . In this deforestation performance incentive contract, the effective deforestation allowed to any 0.36% RL country is higher than in the initial setting (0.195% in lieu of 0.16%) implying that the induced avoided deforestation is lower (0.165% in lieu of 0.2%), whereas the monetary transfers allowed are henceforth respectively USD171.5M for a 0.25% RL country and USD62M for a 0.36% RL country (in lieu of respectively USD160M and USD180M). Note that in this setting, the transfers are higher at 0.25% RL and are then decreasing, compared to the initial situation. In this contract, the developed country pays a so-called information rent to the 0.25% RL country, valued at USD11.5M (171.5 − 160 = USD11.5M). This is an incentive for the developing country to choose its corresponding contract and to behave accordingly. The incentive contract benefits are therefore set to USD211.5M.
Incentive contract in case of observable domestic reduction efforts: rewards for public policy levers
When developing countries' domestic efforts to avoid deforestation are observable, the donor country could propose such a conditional avoided deforestation incentive contract displayed in Table 5 . In this conditional avoided deforestation incentive contract, the avoided deforestation required to any 0.25% RL country is lower than in the initial setting (0.15% in lieu of 0.16%)
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implying an higher induced deforestation (0.1% in lieu of 0.09%), whereas the monetary transfers allowed are henceforth respectively USD149M for a 0.25% RL country and USD197M for a 0.36% RL country (in lieu of respectively USD160M and USD180M). Note that in this setting, the transfers are lower at the 0.25% RL and are then increasing as in the initial situation to obtain a higher level at the 0.36% RL. In this contract, the 0.36% RL country earns USD17M (197 − 180 =USD17M) in information rent. This is an incentive for the developing country to choose its corresponding contract and to behave accordingly. The incentive contract benefits are therefore set to USD257M. currently at stake in the Guyanan "economically-rational" deforestation baseline reporting for example (with unobservable domestic efforts to avoid deforestation). In the Guyanan case, the real RL regarding the annual average deforestation rate over the 2000-2009 period is bound to 0.03% per year while Guyana has obtained a contractual commitment with Norway on a 0.275% per year basis worth USD250M in compensation transfers. 10 The Guyanan real RL has therefore been inflated and Guyana will probably earn some rents from its private information. Indeed, having a higher effective deforestation rate at 0.275%, its gross benefits will be higher, though their real applied efforts will be lower and less costly. Hence there is a net benefit of "mimicking a higher RL" country. This depicts the relevance of our analysis and how we can enlighten possible incentive contract mechanisms within the REDD+ scheme to cope with these issues regarding developing countries' baseline reporting. Furthermore, we extend this framework towards observable avoided deforestation through public policy levers in developing countries.
Theoretically speaking, our previous reasoning states the intuitions as if there were only two types of developing countries that a developed country can make contracts with, and that a choice has to be made depending on the possibility of observing domestic reduction efforts. We extend all these intuitions to a continuum of types in the following sections.
The model
There is a bilateral relationship via the REDD+ scheme between a developed country and a developing country, respectively hereafter the Principal denoted as P and the Agent denoted as A. The P is a developed country, e.g., Norway, or a supranational funding institution centralizing contributions by developed countries. A denotes a developing country, e.g., Indonesia or Guyana.
Within this relationship, their objectives can be summed up in the following way:
• The aim of P is to reduce deforestation to mitigate climate change whilst delegating 10 Guyana did mandate McKinsey & Company to provide reports and economic policy orientation on forest management, as did other developing countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo or Indonesia.
this task to A.
• The aim of A is to stimulate its economic growth whilst controlling deforestation according to a set of thresholds regarding its commitment with P.
Implementing the REDD+ scheme requires designing an institutional arrangement between P and A to reduce the occurrence of incomplete information (private information on A's side) and then inefficiency in forest protection. The REDD+ scheme can be described as follows (along the lines of Karsenty and Ongolo (2012)):
• P would like an overall reduction in deforestation (mainly tropical forests). P proposes an institutional arrangement to A which is a priori capable of modifying deforestation levels, but there are also opportunity costs in reducing these levels. The payment from P to cover these costs takes the form of a direct bilateral payment or via an international fund.
• P does not know exactly what are the costs and benefits for A to reduce deforestation. This is the source of incomplete information between parties.
• To create incentives to reduce deforestation, P offers a menu of contracts (take-it or leave-it offer), and if a contract is signed P covers the opportunity cost of A which alters its economic growth and also pays some information rent to A.
Here θ ∈ [θ,θ] is a type that represents the intrinsic level of deforestation as a baseline, with θ > 0. It is distributed with respect to F (θ) which is a logconcave common prior, 11 where associated (inverse) hazard rates are denoted
Suppose that θ is the least deforesting type, andθ is the most. This informational variable can be viewed as a reduced form of deforestation as a baseline or RL that a given eligible country will privately achieve depending on its economic growth and development, its demographic growth, timber export prices, climatic events, etc. . In some sense, this is an exogenously given proxy of the deforestation baseline which can be found in applied REDD+ schemes.
11 This standard assumption ensures that ϕ (θ) =
is decreasing in θ. The avoided deforestation a is costly for A which incurs not only the opportunity cost of the "lost" deforestation but also implementation and transaction costs. These costs are assumed here to be exogenous represented by a monetary disutility ψ(a) (whilst altering the country development path) such that ψ(0) = 0, ψ (a) > 0 and ψ (a) ≥ 0. 12 We also assume convexity of the marginal cost of efforts that is ψ (a) ≥ 0.
13 Hence A's gross surplus is
, where u(d) is the gross utility of deforestation for A assumed to be increasing and concave, 14 and t the monetary transfer in the REDD+ scheme. However outside the REDD+ scheme efforts are nil, 15 so A's outside option is u (d(θ)) = u (θ). The developed country P which offers the REDD+ mechanism derives a net surplus W = w(d)−(1+λ)t from deforestation, where w(d) is its gross utility assumed to be strictly decreasing and concave, 16 and λ is the marginal cost of public funds for P regarding the monetary transfer t towards A. All agents are risk-neutral.
In the following sections, two types of mechanisms are considered:
• a deforestation performance scheme < t, d >: effective domestic efforts to reduce deforestation are unobservable and cannot be contracted upon, with A's gross surplus as
• a conditional avoided deforestation scheme < t, a >: effective domestic efforts to avoid deforestation are observable and can be included in the mechanism through conditionality, with A's gross surplus as V = u(θ − a(θ)) + t(θ) − ψ(a(θ)).
As a benchmark and to clarify the issues involved, let us consider what would be the firstbest REDD+ mechanism for which information on the RL proxy θ is common knowledge.
Effective efforts are observable and both the deforestation performance based and the conditional avoided deforestation based schemes are equivalent. In such a situation, the Principal P can extract costlessly all the A's net surplus (so U or V are set with u (θ)) and enforce any 12 These implementation and transaction costs could be in turn endogenized through the theory of incentives at a national level between a government and land-users. 13 This technical assumption avoids non-convexities in the P 's optimization problem when information is asymmetric.
14 Again we assume that the technical assumption u (d) ≥ 0 holds, in order to avoid non-convexities when information is asymmetric. This means that marginal utility must be convex.
15 Indeed if t = 0 then −u (θ − a) − ψ (a) < 0 so that the optimal effective domestic effort a * = 0. 16 As a developed country obtains utility from less deforestation whilst allowing it for example, to get carbon credits (as with a CDM). avoided deforestation a(θ) which yields to a deforestation level d = θ −a(θ) that maximizes:
As a result, the first best avoided deforestation a F B (θ) obeys to the marginal condition:
18 At the social optimum, avoided deforestation efforts balance the P 's marginal cost associated with the deforestation level d, i.e., w (d), and the A's marginal cost or benefit associated with the deforestation level d involved by the REDD+ scheme (which costs 1 + λ for each dollar transferred), i.e.,
. By supermodularity 19 of W in a and θ (resp. in d and θ) then
. 20 Concerning the first best transfer, one can see that it is not certainly increasing (or decreasing) with θ:
However, this first-best contract is not optimal if θ is private information for A . Indeed for A, reporting to P a baselineθ instead of θ, leads to a net information rent U(θ,θ) depending on whether the deforestation level d F B (θ) or the domestic efforts to avoid deforestation a F B (θ) is really applied by the agent once it has signed the contract.
This leads us to state the following result (proof in Appendix 8.1).
Lemma 1
The first best REDD+ mechanism tends to be manipulated by developing coun-
. 18 Moreover letting a = θ − d, optimizing over d yields the same result in this first best setting. 19 By concavity of w (d) and u (d) then 20 Indeed, when defining W as a function (d, θ), (with a = θ − d ), it is also supermodular as tries. If a first best deforestation performance scheme is proposed, they are encouraged to overstate their baseline announcement; however if a first best conditional avoided deforestation scheme is proposed, they are likely to understate their baseline announcement.
Consequently, a second best REDD+ mechanism has to be designed to counterbalance all these caveats. We consider successively those second best settings in the following sections.
The deforestation performance scheme
The REDD+ mechanism is built in such a way that when a country A announces a baselinê θ then P expects that A must achieve a deforestation level of d(θ). The underlying idea is that deforestation reductions are compensated and payments are based on performance.
P offers a menu of contracts to A (take-it-or-leave-it offer) as < t(θ), d(θ) > and the timing of the game is summarized in Figure 1 .
For a given RLθ, the REDD+ mechanism is a transfer t(θ) and a deforestation realized d(θ) that must verify participation of the country A and incentive compatibility. To this end, we draw on the revelation principle (Myerson (1979) ) that ensures that direct mechanisms are sufficient to allow agents to reveal their real types θ. Participation will be ensured if
Incentive Compatibility Constraints (ICC) state that for all θ,θ (see Appendix 8.2 for global ICC)
Considering only differentiable contracts entails 
that is the marginal information rent, and thus rents are not increasing with θ. These incentive constraints are in line with the result in Lemma 1: to tackle RL agreements regarding overstatement incentives (θ > θ) included in deforestation performance schemes, the P will
give an information rent to low deforesting countries. As a result, the developing country net rent must decrease with the RL set.
From the marginal information rent, the information rent is for any θ 
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Local second order incentives imply that:
To set correct incentives for the developing country, the deforestation allowed increases with the RL.
22
The expected net surplus of P can be written as:
Substituting t(θ) and including expected information rents lead to write the country's decision program as:
From the following First Order Condition (FOC), one can define the second-best deforestation level d * (θ) as the value of d such that:
Moreover as
At the social optimum, our cost-benefit analysis can be explained such that:
22 Expected information rents are given by (after by parts integration) halshs-00747405, version 1 -31 Oct 2012
• w (d) is P 's marginal cost or benefit associated with the deforestation level d. An increase (respectively a decrease) in d at the margin leads to reducing (resp. enhancing) P 's gross utility.
•
] is A's marginal cost or benefit associated with the deforestation level d. An increase (respectively a decrease) in d at the margin leads to enhancing (resp. reducing) A's gross utility.
is the marginal information cost due to asymmetric information borne by P; as a cost, this increases the cost of the REDD+ policy.
The optimal transfer t * d (θ) can be stated as follows:
This leads to the following proposition (see Appendix 8.3 for analytical results):
Proposition 2 The REDD+ incentive compatible deforestation performance scheme entails:
• More deforestation than the first-best except for the lowest baseline announcement (no distortion at the bottom).
• There is no information rent left to the country responsible for most deforestation.
• d * (θ), the optimal deforestation level with incomplete information increases strictly at the margin with the baseline announced; t * d (θ) the REDD+ optimal transfer decreases strictly.
• The avoided deforestation a (θ) = θ − d * (θ) is not unambiguously increasing with θ. It decreases with θ if ϕ (θ) increases highly.
In line with the standard theory of incentives, there is an information rent / efficiency trade-off within the REDD+ deforestation performance scheme. Deforestation levels must be distorted upwards for any developing country having θ > θ in order to minimize costly information rents. If the REDD+ scheme promotes deforestation levels, the optimal scheme implies tackling forest areas where deforestation is per se the lowest. Information rents are awarded to countries with the lowest deforestation (θ) in order to incite them to induce the highest efficiency whilst coping with deforestation, while leaving other countries tending towards a higher deforestation level. A puzzling result emerges: the resulting avoided deforestation through effective domestic efforts may decrease with the RL announced. Again, this is due to asymmetric information: if the information cost ϕ (θ) increases strongly as baselines are higher announced, it could be optimal to design a deforestation scheme, that yields less reduction efforts, at least for some high types.
Another question is how the deforestation performance scheme depicted in Proposition 2 can be implemented. As discussed in Appendix 8.4, there exists an associated optimal schedule or menu of choices, which can be offered to the agent and which implements the same equilibrium outcome through decentralization. It can be designed as a decreasing
non-linear transfer with respect to the deforestation level performed, T (d). However it is
not absolutely sure that it can be decentralized in linear contracts. Following Leplay et al.
(2011), one could imagine implementing the REDD+ mechanism as a non-linear contract
, where P (d) would be a decreasing non-linear unit receipt based upon the observed international carbon price p: for example, as P (d) = p − γd with γ a scale factor, and E is the proxy carbon emissions factor, which converts deforestation into carbon emissions.
The conditional avoided deforestation scheme
This REDD+ mechanism is now built in such a way that when A and P agree on a RL θ, then P expects that A must carry out an effort to avoid deforestation of a(θ). The underlying idea is that deforestation reductions are "real" compensated successful efforts for regulate developing countries, whilst preserving forests and respecting their commitment.
P offers a menu of contracts to A (take-it-or-leave-it offers) as < t(θ), a(θ) > and the timing of the game is summarized in Figure 2 . For a given RLθ, the REDD+ mechanism is a transfer t(θ) and an avoided deforestation a(θ) that must verify participation of the country and incentive compatibility.
Participation will be ensured if (Participation Constraint (PC)) 
Considering only differentiable contracts entails (by concavity of u)
that is the marginal information rent, and thus rents are not decreasing with θ. These incentive constraints are also in line with the result in Lemma 1: to tackle RL agreements regarding understatement incentives (θ < θ) included in conditional avoided deforestation Substituting t(θ) and including expected rents leads writing its decision program as
One can state the optimal avoided deforestation a * (θ) from the FOC as the value of a such that:
• w (θ − a (θ)) is P 's marginal loss or gain associated with the avoided deforestation a to cope with deforestation carried out by A. An increase (respectively decrease) in a at the margin leads to enhancing (resp. reducing) P 's gross utility.
] is A's marginal cost or benefit associated with its avoided deforestation a, to cope with deforestation. An increase (respectively a decrease) in a at the margin leads to reducing (resp. enhancing) A's gross utility.
• (1+λ)u (θ −a(θ))φ (θ) is the marginal information cost due to asymmetric information borne by P ; as a cost, this increases the cost of the REDD+ policy.
The optimal transfer t * a (θ) can be stated as follows:
This leads to the following proposition (see Appendix 8.6 for analytical results): Proposition 3 The REDD+ incentive compatible conditional avoided deforestation scheme entails:
• Less avoided deforestation than the first-best except for the highest baseline announcement (no distortion at the top).
• There is no information rent left to the least deforesting country.
• a * (θ), the optimal avoided deforestation level with incomplete information and t * a (θ) the REDD+ optimal transfer are strictly increasing at the margin with the baseline announced.
• The resulting deforestation level d (θ) = θ − a * (θ) does not increase unambiguously with θ. It decreases with θ ifφ (θ) decreases strongly.
Our main result is thus that the information rent / efficiency trade-off in the REDD+ conditional avoided deforestation scheme does act in the opposite way as in the deforestation performance contract case. Avoided deforestation levels must be distorted downwards for any developing country having θ <θ (a(θ) < a(θ)), in order to minimize costly information rents. If the REDD+ scheme promotes conditional avoided deforestation levels, the optimal scheme implies tackling forest areas where deforestation is per se the highest. Information rents are awarded to forest areas with the highest deforestation θ , in order to encourage them to make the greatest effort a θ and therefore efficiency to cope with deforestation, whilst leaving other countries to move towards higher deforestation.
We show in Appendix 8.7 that there also exists an associated optimal menu of choices which implements the same contract through decentralization. It can be designed as an increasing non-linear transfer with respect to the avoided deforestation level performed, T (a), but again it is not absolutely sure that it can be decentralized with linear contracts. In the line of our discussion in the previous section, one could imagine implementing the REDD+ mechanism as a non-linear contract T (a) = P (a).E.a where P (a) would be an increasing nonlinear unit receipt based upon the observed international carbon price, as P (a) = p + ηa with η as a scale factor, and E as the proxy carbon emissions factor, which converts deforestation into carbon emissions.
Discussion

Contract choice, avoided deforestation and welfare
In this sub-section, we assess the environmental effectiveness of both contracts and we compare these contracts in terms of welfare gains and losses in a simple quadratic setting (see . All these specific functions are chosen to obtain interior solutions to all outcomes and we assume also that λ ≤ • if θ <θ, that is for countries with low intrinsic deforestation, the deforestation performance schemes are more effective than the conditional avoided deforestation schemes.
• if θ >θ : for countries with high intrinsic deforestation, the conditional avoided deforestation schemes are more effective than the deforestation performance schemes. halshs-00747405, version 1 -31 Oct 2012
3. The conditional avoided deforestation (CAD) reduction effort schemes are preferred to the deforestation performance schemes since expected welfare levels are higher.
For a given θ, the sign of the difference between the welfare obtained through the deforestation performance (DP) scheme and the welfare resulting from the conditional deforestation reduction effort scheme depends on the level of the marginal cost of public funds in the Northern country (see Appendix 8.8). But as a whole, the expected welfare obtained through the conditional deforestation reduction effort contract is always greater than through the deforestation performance contract.
The political economy regarding States
The REDD+ scheme does not for the time encroach on Nations' sovereignty (Streck (2010)), and our analysis shows that conditionality for avoided deforestation is feasible and should As a consequence, considering environmental efficiency and the "degree of failures" regarding the failures stated above, this may lead to promoting conditionality on public policy levers (phase 2 funding) in order to ground the REDD+ scheme with regards to "Fragile"
States. This would provide guidance and practical knowledge from Northern countries, whilst revisiting the relationships with governments in Southern countries to limit policy encroachment. This would also imply that reforms have to be sustained, and that REDD+ payments have to be combined with other international public aid programs, to alter countries' development and induce structural changes. One may add that conditionality in development economics involves mainly five criteria with consequences: inducement; selectivity; paternalism; restraint; and, signalling (Collier et al. (1997) ). It can be stressed that the inducement criterion does apply for our both incentive contracts, even though there is no altruism by the donor country in our setting, compared to a standard aid program for development (Collier et al. (1997) , Ohler et al. (2012) ).
Last, the RL is critical whilst dealing with a menu of contracts situation for a developed country, either on the deforestation level, or on the avoided deforestation level when this is observable. A priori the negotiation stage could reveal some information for the developed country. In Appendix 8.9 we develop a more realistic extension of our analysis in order to take into account the negotiated setting of the RL.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated how the REDD+ scheme can be designed either through a performance-based contract or a conditionality-based contract to help avoid deforestation. Incomplete information as hidden information creates information rents on behalf of developing countries side that renders the REDD+ policy more costly and involves tradeoffs, between the struggle over deforestation and information rents left to the developing countries. Our main results are that limiting deforestation and forest degradation should be incentive-based, whilst controlling effective domestic efforts in developing countries. Also taking implementation costs into account instead of only opportunity costs, explains why incentives and rents can act in opposite directions for each kind of contract. However discussion arises with regard to the political stability of the developing countries involved in REDD+ schemes. We can assert that conditionality is a principle that needs to be at the core of the (2006)).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from the FB contract menu of (equivalent) contracts
if the agent chooses to apply d F B (θ) in the contract (that is the real effort will be a(θ,θ) =
which is increasing ifθ = θ as 
As a result, deforesting agents are likely to overstate their baseline announcement (θ > θ).
However if the agent chooses to apply a
which is decreasing ifθ = θ as
As a result, agents are likely to understate their baseline announcement (θ < θ).
Global Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) with the deforestation performance scheme
Using a standard revealed preference argument, this leads to the global ICC:
add up and yields
is a non decreasing function of θ.
Optimal contract with the deforestation performance scheme
Proof of Proposition 1.
Following the FOC, the REDD+ incentive compatible deforestation scheme entails: halshs-00747405, version 1 -31 Oct 2012
• There is no information rent left to the country with most deforestation as U (θ) = 0 at the optimum.
• There is no distortion at the bottom as d
• d * (θ) is strictly increasing at the margin (as ψ > 0) with the baseline announced.
Indeed from (1), one can differentiate and show that
However one cannot exclude the case for which d
increasing. This is not the case if
that is if ϕ (θ) is highly increasing (or w and u slightly concave).
• REDD+ optimal transfer t * d is decreasing at the margin with the baseline announced. The optimal transfer t * d (θ) can be stated as follows:
Implementation of the deforestation performance scheme
Using an equivalent of the taxation principle (Hammond (1979) , Guesnerie (1981 Guesnerie ( , 1995 ), then for any truth-telling, direct-revelation scheme, there exists an associated schedule or menu of choices which can be offered to the agent and which implements the same equilibrium 
where T (d) is then the optimal transfer as a function of the observed deforestation level. It is a decreasing function of d but this is not certainly convex, as the corresponding effort a is does not incrreases unambiguously. Indeed
does not have a constant sign.
Global Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) with the conditional avoided deforestation scheme
and by summing yields
Hence since u (·) 0 ifθ > θ then a(θ) > a(θ): a(θ) is a non-decreasing function of θ. effort scheme entails:
• There is no information rent left to the country with least deforestation as V (θ) = 0 at the optimum.
• a * (θ) is the solution in a of (2) so that a * (θ) ≤ a F B (θ) as the marginal information
• There is no distortion at the top as a * (θ) = a F B (θ) (asφ θ = 0).
• a * (θ) is strictly increasing at the margin with the baseline announced. Indeed differentiating (2) leads to
Again one cannot exclude the case for which a
that is ifφ (θ) is highly decreasing.
• REDD+ optimal transfer t * a is increasing at the margin with the baseline announced. The optimal transfer t * a can be stated as follows:
8.7 Implementation of the conditional avoided deforestation scheme
As in Appendix 8.4, inverting a * (θ) as an increasing function yields θ * (a), and substituting in t * a (θ) yields
It is an increasing function of a but this is not certainly convex as the corresponding
sign as θ * (a) is not unambiguously greater or less than 1.
Contract comparison in a specific setting
Consider that baseline types are distributed upon the support [1, 2] according to a uniform
. Hence for the First-Best, we have with Λ = 1 1+λ
. The deforestation performance scheme yields d
. Finally the conditional avoided deforestation scheme is
; the resulting deforestation level (or rate) isd
. An example whered * (θ) is decreasing.
Hence it exists a baseline thresholdθ exists withθ = . One can compute expected welfare 25 The other (negative) root is less thanθ = 1 for Λ ≥ 
Assessing the deforestation baseline
Most of the time, REDD+ schemes assume that a prior bargaining process is engaged between the North and the South to determine what is the deforestation baseline for a given country. Without deriving the exact optimal allocations, one can highlight several features of RL falsification. Incentives are clearly affected by the falsification abilities; consequently optimal schemes are expected to be modified because of the cost of disinformation. Rents do not then decrease unambiguously and monotonically for all schemes. Some countervailing incentives may appear: because of costly falsification, for some RL levels it may be the case that developing countries have some incentives to understate their RL rate in deforestation performance schemes. Similarly, they might be compelled to overstate their types in conditional avoided deforestation schemes. As a result, it might be possible that pooling contracts arise: it could be optimal for the donor to propose the same contract for a set of countries with different RL levels.
